Professor Jay Cullen joined Edge Hill in 2021 from the University of York, where he was Professor of Financial Regulation and Director of Research. Prior to this he worked at the University of Sheffield as a Reader in Law (2013-2019) and at Liverpool John Moores University as a Senior Lecturer in Law (2007-2013). He is currently also an Adjunct Research Professor at the University of Oslo where he co-ordinates research on sustainable finance.
Professor Cullen has internationally recognised knowledge of financial regulation, a field in which he has published widely. He is an associate of prestigious research centres, including at the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) and the University of Oslo Faculty of Law. Since 2019, he has been a Research Fellow at the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity (GISP) and an associate of the Association for the Promotion of Political Economy and the Law (APPEAL). He has held visiting positions at Columbia University (2015) and the University of Oslo (2018). He has obtained grant funding from bodies such as the ESRC, the European Commission, the British Academy and the Society of Legal Scholars.
Professor Cullen has presented in his field of research at venues including the Bank of England, European Commission, and the European Parliament, as well as leading universities including Oxford, Cambridge, Cornell and the Wharton School. His work has been cited by amongst others, the Dasgupta Review, the Financial Times, the Bank of England, the European Commission and the Center for American Progress.
Professor Cullen has extensive experience of teaching at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels, primarily in the corporate and financial law fields. He has also supervised many PhD students in these areas.
- “Economically inefficient and legally untenable”
- After 'HLEG': EU banks, climate change abatement and the precautionary principle
- Securitisation, ring-fencing, and housing bubbles
- ‘The Repo Market, Collateral and Systemic Risk: In Search of Regulatory Coherence’
- Excessive Leverage and Bankers Pay
- Executive Compensation in Imperfect Financial Markets